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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
VS. 
DAVID COON 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 940548-CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal is conferred 
upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953 as amended) and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. This appeal is from a jury trial guilty-
verdict for the charge of kidnapping, a second degree felony, 
held before the Honorable Michael D. Lyon. The trial was held on 
July 18 and 19, 19 94, sentencing on August 25, 1994, and judgment 
of conviction dated August 31, 1994, whereupon Judge Michael D. 
Lyon sentenced David Coon to serve a term of one to fifteen years 
in the Utah State Prison, concurrently with Mr. Coon's then 
present prison sentence. The Court also recommended that Mr. 
Coon's previous jail time be credited towards his prison 
sentence. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether counsel's failure to request a lesser included 
1 
offense instruction for attempted kidnapping constituted so 
serious an error that counsel was not functioning as the 
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article one, section twelve of the 
Utah Constitution, and prejudiced Mr. Coon's case to such an 
extent that there is a reasonable probability that but for 
counsel's error David Coon would have been convicted of attempted 
kidnapping rather than kidnapping. 
Standard of Review In order to prevail on such a claim, a 
defendant must show, first, that his or her counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment, and, second, that counsel's performance 
prejudiced the defendant. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 
(Utah 1989) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. VI. 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
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Utah Const, art. I, § 12. 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees 
to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, 
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a jury trial guilty verdict for the 
charge of kidnapping, a second degree felony, held before the 
Honorable Michael D. Lyon. The trial was held on July 18 and 19, 
1994, sentencing on August 25, 1994, and judgment of conviction 
dated August 31, 1994 whereupon Judge Michael D. Lyon sentenced 
David Coon to serve a term of one to fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison, concurrently with Mr. Coon's then present prison 
sentence. The Court also recommended that Mr. Coon's previous 
jail time be credited towards his prison sentence. 
Mr. Coon, through Martin V. Gravis, filed a Notice of Appeal 
with the District Court of the Second Judicial District Court for 
Weber County, State of Utah, on September 17, 1994. This appeal 
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was directed to the Utah Court of Appeals as case number 94058-
CA. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant David Coon was arraigned on May 5, 19 94, in the 
Second Judicial District Court for Weber County with the crimes 
of aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, and forcible 
sexual abuse, a second degree felony. A jury trial was held on 
July 18 and 19, 1994, before the Honorable Michael D. Lyon, 
resulting in a guilty verdict for kidnapping, a second degree 
felony. 
In the course of proceedings, counsel for plaintiff and 
defendant submitted proposed jury instructions. Defendant's 
proposed instruction relating to the charge of aggravated 
kidnapping did not provide the jury the option of finding the 
Defendant guilty of attempted kidnapping, a third degree felony. 
(Jury Instruction No. 25). The requested instruction only 
included the lesser offenses of kidnapping, a second degree 
felony, and unlawful detention, a class B misdemeanor. This 
proposed instruction was given to the jury to conduct their 
deliberations. David Coon was convicted of kidnapping and 
sentenced on August 25, 1994 to serve a term of one to fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison, concurrently with defendant's 
present prison sentence. The court also recommended that 
defendant's previous jail time be credited towards his prison 
sentence. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
David Coon was denied effective assistance of counsel in 
violation of both his state and federal constitutional rights. 
Mr. Coon's counsel rendered a deficient performance by failing to 
request a lesser included offense instruction on attempted 
kidnapping. This failure could not be contributed to a tactical 
decision, but rather fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment. Counsel's failure to request 
an attempted kidnapping instruction prejudiced Mr. Coon. There 
is a reasonable probability that in the absence of counsel's 
error, David Coon would have been convicted of attempted 
kidnapping rather than kidnapping. 
ARGUMENT 
COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE FELL BELOW AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF 
REASONABLE PROFESSIONAL JUDGEMENT BY FAILING TO REQUEST A 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION AND THIS FAILURE 
PREJUDICED THE DEFENDANT. 
The United States Supreme Court established the standard for 
determining the existence of ineffective assistance of counsel at 
trial in its decision of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.2d. 674 (1984). The Supreme Court 
stated that in order to prevail on such a claim, a defendant must 
show, first, that his or her counsel rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, 
and second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. 
Id. at 687-88, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65. 
In applying this standard the United States Supreme Court 
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stated in Strickland: 
[A] court need not determine whether counsel's 
performance was deficient before examining the 
prejudice suffered by defendant as a result of the 
alleged deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness 
claim is not to grade counsel's performance. If it is 
easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the 
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect 
will often be so, that course should be followed. 
446 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. The Utah Supreme Court has 
often addressed the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel by 
applying first the second part of the Strickland test in order to 
avoid unnecessarily evaluating counsel's professional 
performance.l 
A. Failure to request a lesser offense instruction 
prejudiced David Coon. 
The Utah Supreme Court defined the requisite prejudice 
needed to meet the second prong of Strickland in State v. Frame, 
723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986). In Frame, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that "[t]o be found sufficiently prejudicial, defendant 
must affirmatively show that a 'reasonable probability' exists 
that, but for counsel's error, the result would have been 
different." 723 P.2d 401 at 405. The court went on to define 
"reasonable probability" as "that sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the reliability of the verdict." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court reiterated the requirement of 
reasonable probability in State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019 (Utah 
1987). In Archuleta, the defendant was convicted of rape of a 
1
 See, e.g., State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1987); 
State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986). 
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mentally impaired woman. On appeal, defendant made a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel based, in part, on counsel's 
failure to request a lesser offense instruction similar to the 
case at hand. In denying defendant's claim, the Utah court found 
that defendant failed to show a reasonable likelihood of a 
different result absent the alleged deficient conduct. Id. at 
1024. The necessary element to defendant's rape charge in 
Archuleta was that of consent and the Utah Supreme Court found 
that the defendant would have been acquitted if the jury had not 
been convinced that there was none. There was no evidence at 
trial which contradicted the victim's testimony that she 
repeatedly said "no." 
Unlike Archuleta , there is contradicting evidence and 
multiple elements which could be questioned in this case. The 
jury in this case had two lesser offenses to aggravated 
kidnapping from which to choose. The lowest included offense was 
unlawful detention, a class B misdemeanor. The necessary 
elements of unlawful detention are: 1) said defendant, David 
Coon, 2) knowingly restrained S. Williams unlawfully so as to 
interfere substantially with her liberty. 
The culpability required for the offense of unlawful 
detention is far below that of kidnapping. There is a huge gap 
in both the culpability and the punishment between unlawful 
detention and kidnapping. There is a reasonable likelihood that 
a jury would find the defendant more blameworthy than the 
elements available in the charge of unlawful detention. The 
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evidence presented in the trial of this matter did arguably rise 
above the elements of unlawful detention. But the only other 
reasonable charge available to the jury was that of kidnapping, a 
second degree felony. 
The necessary elements of kidnapping are: 1) said defendant, 
David Coon, 2) intentionally or knowingly, 3.a) without authority 
of law and against the will of the victim (S. Williams), detained 
or restrained S. Williams for any substantial period; or 3.b) 
detained or restrained S. Williams in circumstances exposing her 
to risk of serious bodily injury; or 3.c) held S. Williams in 
involuntary servitude. Elements 1 and 2 were obviously met in 
this case. The prosecution also proved that David Coon detained 
or restrained S. Williams without authority of law. The 
deficiency in this case goes directly to the victim's will and 
the period of time in which David Coon restrained her against her 
will. If defendant's counsel requested the lesser included 
offense instruction on attempted kidnapping, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury would have found David Coon 
guilty of attempted kidnapping rather than kidnapping. 
B. Counsel's failure to request a lesser offense jury 
instruction fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable profession judgment. 
By failing to request a lesser offense jury instruction, 
David Coon's counsel performed below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgement. The request would have been 
very simple to make. By failing to make the request, counsel 
denied Mr. Coon the reasonable possibility of being convicted of 
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a crime lower than kidnapping. 
In State v. Wood, the Utah Supreme Court stated that trial 
tactics lie within the prerogative of counsel. State v. Wood, 
648 P. 2d 71, 91 (Utah 1981). However, unlike Wood, in which 
counsel refused to present the defense of innocence the failure 
in this case was not an affirmative decision on counsel's part. 
Counsel did include the lesser offense of unlawful detention and, 
therefore, there is no trial tactic to omit attempted kidnapping. 
The failure was a mere oversight on the part of counsel which 
denied David Coon a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
David Coon was denied effective assistance of counsel 
in violation of both his state and federal constitutional rights. 
Mr. Coon's counsel rendered a deficient performance by failing to 
request a lesser included offense instruction on attempted 
kidnapping. This failure could not be contributed to a tactical 
decision, but rather fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment. Counsel's failure to request 
an attempted kidnapping instruction prejudiced Mr. Coon. There 
is a reasonable probability that in the absence of counsel's 
error, David Coon would have been convicted of attempted 
kidnapping rather than kidnapping. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /y da/,of December, 1994. 
Stephfame Ames 
Attorney for Appellant 
ADDENDUM 
i i i 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of Count 
I, Aggravated Kidnapping, a first degree felony, you must find 
from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the 
following elements of that crime: 
1) Said defendant, David Coon, 
2) intentionally or knowingly, 
3) without authority or law and against the will 
of the victim (S. Williams), by any means and 
in any manner, seized, confined, detained or 
transported a person (S. Williams) with intent: 
A. To facilitate the commission, 
of a felony 
OR 
B. To inflict bodily injury on or 
to terrorize a person (S. 
Williams) 
OR 
C. To commit forcible sexual 
abuse. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all 
of the essential elements of that offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant of Count I, 
Aggravated Kidnapping, a first degree felony. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all 
of the essential elements of that offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt and you also find that the defendant is mentally ill, it is 
your duty to find the defendant guilty and mentally ill of Count 
I, Aggravated Kidnapping, a first degree felony. 
On the other hand, if the evidence has failed to so 
establish one or more of said elements, you should then consider 
whether the defendant is guilty of a lesser included offense of 
Kidnapping, a second degree felony, the elements of which are as 
follows: 
1) Said defendant, David Coon, 
2) intentionally or knowingly, 
3) (<~- without authority of law and against the will 
of the victim (S. Williams), detained or 
restrained S. Williams for any substantial 
period; or 
ffl) y detained or restrained S. Williams in 
circumstances exposing her to risk of serious 
bodily injury; or 
) (_ held S. Williams in involuntary servitude. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each 
and all of the essential elements of that offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant 
of Kidnapping, a second degree felony. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each 
and all of the essential elements of that offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt and you also find that the defendant is 
mentally ill, it is your duty to find the defendant guilty 
and mentally ill of Kidnapping, a second degree felony. 
On the other hand, if the evidence has failed to so 
establish one or more of said elements, you should consider 
whether or not the defendant is guilty of the lesser 
included offense of Unlawful Detention, a Class B 
misdemeanor, the elements of which are as follows: 
1) Said defendant, David Coon, 
2) knowingly restrained S. Williams unlawfully so 
as to interfere substantially with her 
liberty. 
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